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2010-2011 Off-Season: CBA – From Cannot Bargain At All To Could Be An Agreement?
 
July 19, 2011  At 12:53 AM CST
By Eric M. Scharf
 
The NFL owners and NFL Players Association (NFLPA) appear to potentially be on the cusp of a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) sometime within the next few days. Before the CBA drama officially becomes yesterday's news, there are a handful of related issues that require deeper exposure . . . to show they are not nearly as complex as has been advertised by various player and owner representatives.
 
Who Came First – The Owner Or The Player?

You could be completely disinterested in professional sports . . . and you would still be able to logically rationalize the existence of sports players before the existence of sports team owners.  Natural athletic skill was put to casual use and manual labor long before it was ever recognized and organized into professional sport.

You would still be able to logically rationalize the existence of good quality, naturally skilled sports players before the existence of sports team owners.

You would still be able to logically rationalize the existence of steadily growing wagers on those sports players by those would-be sports team owners.

You would still be able to logically rationalize the existence of “research” – performed on those sports players, where they commonly played the game and the level of interest from the local yokels – by those would-be sports team owners . . . on what it might take to organize, host, attract fans, and profit from an American football game.

You would still be able to logically rationalize the existence of a “test run” game – where those sports players were paid for their playing time (for the first time in their lives), where those local yokels were made to pay for access to that game (which they used to watch for free) . . . and where those would-be sports team owners made a large enough profit to arrange even more games.

You would still be able to logically rationalize the existence of the desire by those would-be sports team owners to actually become sports team owners – offering low per-game payouts to those sports players (who could not believe they were being paid to play several of the games they loved) and offering high per-game tickets to fans . . . who would rather pay than lose access to the game they have learned to love.

The money-making potential and popularity of American football ramped up from there – even though it could have just as easily failed as the relatively unknown stepchild of the marriage between rugby and soccer. American football certainly took time to become the big dollar behemoth it is today, but it is here to stay . . . apparently regardless of how high ticket prices continue to get for the average fan.

While the player came first, this fact is woefully insignificant to the owner who – even after some historic gains by the player's union – still has near-complete control over the game, its participants, and its fans.
 


The Free And The Brave

Americans recently celebrated the anniversary of one of the most important days in the history of the United States. That day was the 4th of July – otherwise known as Independence Day.

The United States national anthem – The Star-Spangled Banner – is sung or performed at an incredible number of entertainment venues on a yearly basis but never quite so strongly as on Independence Day.

The lyrics for that song end with:

“And the star-spangled banner in triumph shall wave
O’er the land of the free and the home of the brave!”

Most citizens of the United States – fans and non-fans of the NFL – interpret the ending of The Star-Spangled Banner to be about gaining freedom from tyranny to do whatever you wish . . . and being brave enough to defend that freedom whenever it is being challenged.

While the individuals and institutions of America have the freedom to fail or succeed, to be short-sighted or forward-thinking, and to be mature or moronic at any moment . . . common sense remains the standard bearer for all interpretation.

The NFL owners and the NFLPA – not so ironically – are yet the latest in a long line of big business entities to be unimaginative in their interpretation of the ending of The Star-Spangled Banner.

The NFL owners and the NFLPA had freedom – years ago, in fact – from shortsighted greed of the moment to build a revolutionary long-term collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with each other. They had the freedom to be brave enough to defend such an extendable and rewarding commitment whenever it was being challenged.

Freedom is power. Freedom means nothing without the will to use it. Protecting a freedom is not enough if you are not going to use it. Demanding protection for a freedom that goes unused is itself an abuse of freedom . . . or of power.

While politics have always had a “unique” way of determining which individuals and institutions get to enjoy which freedoms, the politics of profit have always operated on a separate and much faster track.

People – fans and non-fans of the NFL – around the world accuse the NFL owners and the NFLPA of being greedy in their inability to agree on how to split a projected yearly profit pie of approximately $9 billion dollars.

The NFL owners have been accused of taking liberties in establishing a lockout of the NFLPA due to alleged financial losses from a “suddenly” imbalanced CBA . . . product quality notwithstanding (SEE any team – like the Dallas Cowboys – that underperformed in 2010).

People should understand the NFL owners and the NFLPA are, in fact, not greedy at all. Call the owners and players lazy, misguided, and even stupid, but calling them greedy is disgracing the definition of greedy.

Greed•y/ˈGrēdē: Excessively desirous of acquiring or possessing, especially wishing to possess more than what one needs or deserves.

 
If the NFL owners and the NFLPA were truly greedy, they would have never allowed themselves even the smallest chance to be exposed to a work stoppage . . . ever.

If the NFL owners and the NFLPA were truly greedy, they would have never agreed to introduce a “poison pill” in their last CBA . . . allowing the owners to back out and lock out over a percentage discrepancy to which they knowingly committed themselves.

Stoppage Sources
 
Fans should consider the basic-but-big components of the grand NFL existence that can change enough on a regular basis to create scenarios for work stoppages: (1) the discovery of potential new revenue sources, (2) greater profit than expected from existing revenue sources, and (3) the infrastructure cost of maintaining product quality.

The combination of other important but secondary components – such as (4) professional grade referees, (5) stadium grounds keepers, (6) stadium security, (7) officially-licensed NFL gear retailers, (8) stadium concession vendors, (9) stadium parking staff, and (10) stadium waste management teams – come close but not close enough to actually creating full blown unrecoverable work stoppages.

The NFL owners are far more willing to deal with alternatives to these secondary components . . . than they are willing to revisit the idea of scab players. There were never enough Erik Kramer discoveries to offset the embarrassment of games played by non-union members.

While each of the big-but-basic sources can be unpredictable, there can and should be triggers within the CBA that allow work to continue uninterrupted as each of these components are addressed in parallel . . . with pre-determined representatives for the NFL owners and NFLPA members who wish to be fully involved.

The importance of limiting the number of cooks in the kitchen can never be understated when it comes to the proper and professional formulation of labor agreements . . . at any level.

“Potential” New Revenue Sources do not always translate into “immediate” profit. Most potential new revenue sources begin as simple ideas – marrying one business group’s promotional desires to another business group’s promotion-capable products.

These ideas must be vetted by the principals (NFL owners and NFLPA) – as even the very best entrepreneurial ideas get tossed aside due to the discomfort (or fear of change) of one or more principals of a business group. Market analysis must be performed (to see if there is, indeed, a marketplace for the idea).

Seed investment (if any) must be determined. Financial projections must be presented by market analysts (who diligently follow the daily market performances of the promotion-capable products being considered). Potential partners for product marketing, manufacturing, and distribution (in-store and online) need to be recommended, vetted through would-be partner presentation bids, and ultimately chosen.

Risk assessments must be readied – as businesses generally do not like to take chances and like them even less in a struggling economy. The idea may look, feel, smell, and taste like an absolute winner – and it can be both considered and brought to life without a work stoppage . . . but, then, the NFL owners and NFLPA have the freedom to select success or silliness.

Greater Profit Than Expected does not have to receive a second thought – as long as the NFL owners and NFLPA agree to a specific percentage split for that surplus. The true key to dividing any profit surplus is less about the percentage split and more about a binding acknowledgement that each entity has the freedom to take their share and do what they wish.

Most experienced business people understand this simple percentage split only becomes complicated if the profit surplus becomes greater and greater with the passing of each fiscal year. This unpredictable fact can easily be solved through a PEP (Proportional Escalator Percentages) talk.

The owners and players can easily agree on a top-to-bottom list of PEP – no matter how ridiculous the potential financial figures – that will automatically trigger with each landmark profit surplus that is achieved. The PEP talk can be both considered and brought to life without a work stoppage . . . but, then, the NFL owners and NFLPA have the freedom to select success or silliness.

Most experienced business people also understand this simple percentage split can become even more complex if either entity places a directive on the unpredictable profit surplus.

The NFL owners and NFLPA would never be lazy, misguided, and even stupid enough to use their freedom to fund something as mammoth as new stadium construction or something as immediately necessary and urgent as comprehensive medical coverage – through the hope but not the guarantee of a profit surplus . . . or would they?

Fans have learned how badly large corporations want out from under big ticket items like medical coverage – even when the very infrastructure and quality of their product (like NFL players) requires such an investment.

Infrastructure Costs – like new stadium construction and comprehensive medical coverage – are obviously enormous when it comes to a business entity like the NFL. The key to supporting such costs lies in the realistic and reasonable identification and acknowledgement of any and all such costs. Shortcuts – with these types of mega costs – must be a sure thing or you are looking at a truly epic fail.

Discussing such costs at a high level – in the absence of an in-depth and detailed perspective – is no discussion at all. How can you hope to understand the true cost of such an exceptional grid iron venue – like Cowboys Stadium – for NFL players and fans . . . without acknowledging the incredible variety of business and entertainment events it must support in order to help Jerry Jones see a quicker return on such a gargantuan investment?

How can you hope to understand the true cost of such exceptional medical coverage for NFL players . . . without acknowledging how quickly injuries can change from manageable to career-ending, or how some of those injuries can become literal money monsters as part of retirement coverage – potentially for hundreds former players?

Infrastructure costs need to be supported from the NFL’s core revenue streams (like the sickeningly sweet network and satellite television contracts) and traditional investment partners (from public to private and from bond-driven to cash-on-hand) . . . but – reasonably – never from profit surplus. Infrastructure costs can be discussed among mature adults who wish to leave no stone unturned towards solid, long-term infrastructure support . . . but, then, the NFL owners and NFLPA have the freedom to select success or silliness.

Wealth Above Health?

Fans should wonder about the NFLPA’s sincere interest in comprehensive health coverage for active players, and recently retired players, as well as the first and second generation players who helped make today’s NFL possible.

Would the current crop of NFL players (outside of the top 10 percent) really care so much about their own medical coverage right now – if it were not for the noisy and logical racket desperately being made by so many first and second generation retired NFL players?

NFLPA representatives and sports agents know better and understand what a good medical plan can do for active and retired professional sports players but – until recently – neither group had any interest in asking the NFL owners to take some of the money normally paid out in salary . . . and repurpose it for health benefits.

NFLPA representatives (with some still being active players) do not want money being taken out of their feedbags, and sports agents – unless I am mistaken – do not realize any take home pay from the implementation of comprehensive long-term health coverage. Sports agents certainly want the best for their meal tickets, but upfront money remains the best kind of money.

 
 
After all – as long as the current players are getting paid at least $340,000 for the upcoming 2011-2012 season, they should be able to put away (or invest) enough money to fund their own health coverage expenses in retirement.

Yes – the thought of most NFL players rubbing two pennies together in any effort to invest or save is absolutely hysterical.

Yes – the thought of a financial advisor insisting NFL players rub those pennies together is more realistic – but how many active players always listen to their financial advisors? Furthermore – how many active players are potentially being swindled by those very same financial advisors who have only the best interests of their meal tickets at heart? But . . . I digress with another story for another day.

What an American soldier – currently fighting for our country in the Middle Least or retired with crippling injuries – would do for the type of long-term comprehensive medical attention at which the NFL owners are about to throw even more funding? Time spent in a VA hospital for a major knee operation – not performed by the world renowned Dr. James Andrews – might change an NFL player opinion or two.

The NFL players potentially get their heads concussed, their knees blown out, and their rotator cuffs torn once a week during a 16 game season. 1st and 2nd generation NFL players dealt with many of the same injuries . . . with nothing even close to the medical attention received by today's players. America’s armed forces, on the other hand, potentially get their bodies dismantled every day of every week until their tours of duty are completed successfully, ended through injury . . . or terminally cut short.

The NFL players are free to make as much money as they want – and after they have engorged themselves on enough cool cash . . . maybe they will find a way to appreciate what they have and place health before wealth.
 
Fans can rest assured that at least the retired NFL veterans – many of whom so desperately need the potential infusion of additional retirement medical funding being considered as part of a new CBA – have their priorities straight.

18 Games

It is true the current 16-game NFL season continues to produce an increasing number of injuries – especially to the top players in the league.

What happens when star players go down? They are replaced with back-ups. These back-ups may be:

1) Another starter who is acquired through a salary cap-destroying blockbuster trade who rides in on his white stallion with his chrome-plated shoulder pads to save the day.

2) A former starter who can jump into the fray with a little rust and a lot of attitude and help pull out a victory with partially-diminished natural skills.

3) A veteran or rookie role player who is not and has never been mentally or physically prepared for anything more than playing the gunner or long snapper on special teams.

The NFL is not going to allow any of its players to start bulking up on performance-enhancing drugs – at least not publicly – so that star players can recover faster from injury.

No fan enjoys seeing a star player replaced with – typically – a low grade back-up. That back-up – on the very next play – usually and most often misses his assignment . . . which turns into a sack for a loss, an intercepted pass returned for a touchdown, a fumble in the red zone, or a dropped catch that could have kept the chains moving.

 
 
Fans have heard plenty from a number of NFL star players – raising issue with how an 18-game season would cause more injuries and ruin careers.

This is true . . . if you have a problem sharing playing time.

Star players know the chances of starting all the games of the current 16-game format are tough enough.

Star players know the chances of their back-ups “stealing” playing time (and incentive money) in the current 16-game format are slim . . . but possible.

Star players – those who really are all about being a good teammate – know their teams will win more games if their understudies are more capable of playing when injuries occur. Nothing is more valuable to a rookie or a back-up than playing time on any given Sunday.

Star players know exactly what an 18-game season could mean to their careers, the personal growth of their understudies, the potential increases in wins for their team . . . and the negative effect on a star player’s incentivized earnings and personal statistics.

The NFLPA does not want the NFL owners suddenly drooling over the idea of “running back by committee” for every position on the roster. Then, again, fans do not like seeing their favorite players going down in a heap before the season is over.

If the fans really want their TEAMS to succeed, then, they might also see the logic in a longer season that results in more balanced playing time between superstars and back-ups.

Fans can now only ponder what might have been . . . as the concept of an 18-game NFL season was officially (but only temporarily?) shelved early in the ongoing CBA negotiations.

NFL superstars – for now – get to keep their 16 games . . . as well as the growing specter of more injury-shortened seasons and careers.

The Rookie Wage Scale

The NFL owners have had so much control over the game of professional football for so long and yet – like the CBA silliness of today – they managed to allow the little detail of signing bonuses to get completely out of control.

The contract of a first round draft choice is – after all – a completely different story without a signing bonus, and the same goes for a veteran player.

Thanks to our very own Jerry Jones, the NFL established the “Deion Sanders Rule” when Jerry took advantage of a salary cap loop hole to sign Neon Deion to a $35 million dollar contract . . . including a $13 million dollar signing bonus. Deion certainly proved he was worth the mega money in helping the Cowboys to their third Super Bowl victory in four years in the ‘90s.
 
 
 
Was Deion's deal the first one to be caught and tabbed as toxic?  No.  Did this occur as aggressive retribution by certain teams (having run into their own roadblocks attempting the very same thing) which had no interest in seeing the Cowboys reload with Neon Deion for a fourth straight title run?  Yes.

Since that time – and forever more – whenever a team circumvented / circumvents the salary cap with a bad player contract, that team pays the price . . . twice – with any signing bonus being converted into "dead money" that gets accelerated into the immediate or following fiscal year upon that player's early exit from the team (whether by cut or retirement – if memory serves). Cowboys fans got another Super Bowl championship out of this Sanders snafu, but the residual effect on salary caps for years to come certainly has ruined it for the rest of the league . . . as well as their own star-spangled team.

Deion’s agent at the time could have cared less – even if he knew the loop hole was going to cause grief for owners and players alike in the future. His job was to get Deion the best possible deal – just like any other agent for any other professional sports star. It still would have been profound and impressive if Deion’s agent would have put the brakes on the deal in an effort to make it legit – out of concern and protection for future blockbuster deals . . . and meal tickets.

Deion was still a relatively young man when he signed with the Cowboys back in 1995 – but not so young that he could not have said: “Wait a minute. I love me some me, and I love me some money, too. Is this deal really legit like my man Hammer . . . or is this going to come back and bite the entire league in the butt in the future?” Deion’s deal was deemed not so legit – after the fact . . . and Hammer never knew when to quit.

Stephen Jones – Executive VP, COO, and most trusted son of Jerry – attempted to convince his father to give up on signing the shining one . . . over related contract concerns. Stephen must have been so convinced there was no other way to rearrange the contract terms, or he probably would not have wanted to punch his father in the face, as Jerry has gone onto recall many times.

No one forced the owners to offer guarantees (or partial guarantees) in the form of signing bonuses. No one forced the owners to offer top 10 rookies such huge contracts. Who were the veteran players and agents to stop the owners from paying out big money to their own teammates and clients? After all – everyone was eventually going to receive that big money, right? Wrong.

Once the veterans and their agents understood how negative the impact was going to be – towards their collective earning potential, salary caps, and roster flexibility – by these professional mega deals for inexperienced college happy meals, they decided a rookie wage scale was finally in order.

Call them lazy, misguided, and even stupid, but they are not greedy.

The NFL owners had the most control for the longest time. The NFLPA had some control but only enough to be irritating. Their collective agents have always been master manipulators in the middle. None of these entities – separate or together – ever made an effort to refine the concept of signing bonuses before it was too late.

“Too late” technically does not exist, as the owners and players can still remedy the signing bonus issue through a new rookie wage scale . . . if they really want to do so. Call the owners and players lazy, misguided, and even stupid, but calling them greedy is disgracing the definition of greedy.

 
 
A rookie wage scale has evidently been agreed upon as part of a new CBA, but until it is signed into anti-trust, err, NFL law – with rookies having to earn more of what they are given . . . and with proven veterans getting more of what they have earned – fans should not hold their breath.
 
Free Agency
 
Speaking of proven veterans getting more of what they have earned, the NFL owners have been less than willing to be timely in their handling of a number of free agency cases in the past . . . and in the present – with players like the San Diego Chargers' Vincent Jackson and the New England Patriots' Logan Mankins.

Most fans are familiar with the "franchise" and "transition" tags NFL teams are allowed to apply each season to select players.

Most fans are also aware of how those tags are aggressively used by NFL teams to limit the escape routes of talented players who may either be unrestricted or restricted free agents. Teams – understandably – want to hold onto all of their best talent as often as possible . . . even if they have to play dirty to do it.

General Managers, head coaches (with roster control), and talent evaluators from scouting departments are always under tremendous pressure to find ideal players and the fewer quality players you need to procure – to add to or replace on your roster – the less stress you must endure. Yes – "that is why they get paid the big bucks" . . . but that does not make their jobs any easier.

Free agency – ideally – should work similarly to the following scenario.

A team has an established, talented, and healthy player who is up for unrestricted free agency. The player is still young enough to command a big contract if he is allowed onto the open market. The player would like to remain with his current team – for the right price – of course.

The player understands his team may slap the franchise tag on him . . . guaranteeing him a one-year salary equaling an average of the top five salaries at his position in the league. The transition tag, however, "only" guarantees him an average of the top ten player salaries at his position.

His team wants him to sign the "one year tender" to buy both parties additional time to draw up a mutually beneficial long-term contract. Time passes and his patience is rewarded with a big pay day and several more years with the same team. The contract contains a number of easily achievable incentive clauses – which essentially provide "voidable years."

This is particularly good if the team needs to free up additional salary cap space by adjusting existing player contracts . . . or if the player suffers an untimely injury that just happens to coincide with a major incentive he has reached. Bad for him – in this case – and good for his team.

What if the player does not want a long-term contract (as a result of failed and embarrassing negotiations), and he does not even wish to sign his tender offer and does not wish to show up for work – until just late enough in the season to cause problems for everyone involved? Then you see the situations in which Jackson, Mankins, and there respective teams are currently embroiled.

Other parts of this scenario include negotiations with and offers from other teams – as well as the original team's right to match any offer or to collect two first round draft choices from the player's new team (which has a tendency to scare off less-than-desperate interested parties).

The transition tag – in this case – only allows the original team the "right of first refusal" (where it has seven days to match a competing offer). If the original team chooses not to match the offer, that team receives nothing in return for losing that player.

Ultimately – a good fan does not want to see a good player held hostage by their favorite team if a new deal cannot be reasonably worked out to the point where everyone involved has some level of satisfaction. It is hard to imagine fans wanting the current brand of NFL parody to really cut so close to the bone that you can only confidently align yourself with a team's logo . . . rather than the star players who may have given that logo meaning in the first place.

Then, again, the league has appeared to be heading that way since the NFLPA first won the right to conditional free agency. A team may be on the verge of reaching the Super Bowl, and it does not want to relinquish anyone from the roster (who might just prove to be the missing piece to their championship puzzle) – not even a player who has absolutely earned the unrestricted free agent status he will have reached at season's end.

If a deal cannot be reached and the player – for any number of reasons – becomes embittered, that team needs to be willing to face the same reality that player already sees. The team can and will attempt to change the player's mind, but this effort can and will make things even worse . . . creating unnecessary stress with other teammates (who want to see the distracting issue put to bed before it gets really bent out of shape by the press).

Sometimes – maybe rarely – the player decides the money is not the issue as much as his surroundings no longer being a fit.

The grass is not always green on the other side, and NFL free agency can be as painful as it is exciting.

It will be very interesting to see how-if-and-when settlements (cash payment or immediate and unrestricted free agency) are set forth for players like Jackson, Mankins, and others – once a new CBA is ratified.
 
 
 
 
It will be even more interesting to see if Jerry Jones can land another impressive 21 in the poker game of NFL free agency. He has a handful of backfiring blue chips – in Marc Colombo, Leonard Davis, Roy Williams, and Marion Barber among others – to push towards the pot. Cowboys fans can only hope lightning strikes nice twice . . . with awesome Asomugha helping the Dallas secondary to rise from the 2010 ashes just in time to flame the 2011 offenses.
 
Tag! You're It!
 
Everyone wants a solution to the way franchise and transition tagging is worked out. Fans want their favorite players to stay with their favorite teams. The players want good money from good teams that offer good opportunities to win a good deal of the time. Teams want their best players to remain within their organizations until the twilight of their careers. Agents want their meal tickets to go to the highest bidder – every single year if possible.

 
 
Before identifying a solution, however, you must acknowledge a variety of familiar scenarios:

1) A player wants a long-term deal with his existing team. No muss, no fuss – “My family and I have planted strong roots in this town, we love this organization, and I want to retire with this team.” The player’s team feels the same way – “We know what he has meant to both our team and the surrounding community in just his first few years in the league. He is a special player, and we want to continue this wonderful relationship for years to come.”

2) A player wants a long-term deal with a new team. “I have really enjoyed my time with the organization, and I am proud of what we have accomplished together, but I think it is time for a change of scenery. My family and I are looking for a fresh start.” The player’s team does not agree with this, but due to a possible combination of elements conspiring against any change of heart – stagnant negotiations and a younger, nearly as capable, less costly option currently riding the roster – the team obliges the player’s request. “This player has done great things for our organization – both on and off the field – and while we would prefer he remain with us, we will make every effort to seek fair value from another team in exchange for his services. We wish him nothing but the best.”

3) A player wants nothing more than the one-year tender – where a limited commitment will allow him and his agent to comfortably survey the league landscape of available and potential opportunities (where a position he may covet on a specific team may be affected by the impending retirement of the incumbent player there). The player does not want a trade, and he just prefers to pay his final dues towards unconditional and unrestricted free agent status. The player’s team begrudgingly acquiesces, but it will make every attempt to trade him during the season before losing any chance to recoup his value from another team – as is their right.

4) A player wants no new deal with any team, and he simply wants to see his unrestricted free agent status honored. He and his agent want to test the open market, and they wish to figure out the next move on their own timeline. The player is convinced he needs a fresh venue. He does not like the direction in which the team is moving – or the systems they are using. He may no longer even see eye-to-eye with the team’s coaching staff. The team does not agree with the player’s assessment, and they are less than thrilled at the proposition of losing a player of his experience and skill without receiving something of near-equal value in return from another team. The team wants him to honor his contract in return for their agreement to revisit his request at the completion of his contract. The negotiations have been contentious, and the player’s agent has hinted at a hold out – maybe even retirement – if the player’s demands are not met. Public mud-slinging ensues and both parties are equally guilty of sabotage.

These are the most cliché and prominent of NFL free agency scenarios – although a variety of franchise and transition tag derivatives also exist, and they all must be reviewed before establishing an effective rule to make the tagging system – and its effect on free agency – far more efficient.

There is, in fact, a solution to the issue of disenfranchised players - who have specifically been franchise tagged - and the NFL teams which naturally want their players to honor their contracts, acknowledge their tagged status, and keep a minimum safe distance from the rest of the league.

There would be a new free agency rule called "The Donald Sterling Rule" . . . or "The Disser" (DSR) for short - as the result will leave either the player or the team feeling dissed.

Donald Sterling (the owner of the Los Angeles Clippers) - of course - is the Mike Brown of the National Basketball Association (NBA). As accurate as the label might be to call it the "The Mike Brown Rule," his fellow owners would never allow such a name . . . out of respect for his late father, the great Paul Brown.

Nonetheless, the DSR requires an NFL team to follow all possible good faith steps towards signing one of their own unrestricted free agents upon which they have applied the franchise tag designation. The player in question – and his representation – must follow the same steps.

A one-year tender (guaranteeing an average of the top five salaries for that player's position – using a franchise tag as an example) must be offered to sign the player. That one-year tender will include contract language plainly stating a promise by the NFL team to immediately commence negotiations on a long-term deal.

3rd party arbitration – from the same state of New York as the NFL headquarters – would be used to enforce and track the actions of all parties in this process. The NFL and NFLPA would select from an available pool of vetted 3rd party arbitrators and assign that person to one case at a time – as they arise. Multiple arbitrators will be assigned when multiple cases are active. The absence of the Minnesota Supreme Court – as will allegedly be the case if-and-when the new CBA is ratified – greatly encourages the NFL to comply with the DSR.

If the player’s team makes a more-than-reasonable long-term offer (average of top 5 salaries or better) and the player chooses not to sign – based upon one of the four scenarios addressed above – then, his inaction triggers one of the following DSR results.

Result 1: If the player has, indeed, signed his one-year tender (and has shown no interest in a long-term commitment with his original team), he must play through that one-year tender. He will then be given his unconditional unrestricted free agent status upon completion of that season. While a new team can trade for the player, that new team – like the original team – has only to the end of that season to re-sign the player. That new team will be unable to apply another franchise tag to the player – as that would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

Result 2: If the player has refused to sign his one-year guaranteed tender offer - and he resorts to "belligerent public behavior detrimental to his team and the league" (not including a holdout) in order to accelerate his way out of Dodge, the player is immediately barred from his teams’ facilities and placed onto a "Free Agency Slot Track" (FAST) supplemental draft.

The FAST draft is designed for players – who wish to completely short circuit an NFL team’s right to apply a franchise or transition tag to a player at least / at most one time while under that team’s employ. The FAST draft is also designed for NFL teams – who wish to unfairly punish a player for seeking the freedom (or wanting the freedom he has earned) to sign any CBA-regulation contract with any team in the league. Recall Randy Moss and Brandon Marshall – when they caused so much grief for the Minnesota Vikings and Denver Broncos, respectively. Recall Al Davis’s ridiculous treatment of Marcus Allen.

The FAST draft – when the NFL player is in the wrong – allows the "worst to select first," where the selecting team forfeits a 1st round draft pick from a future draft to the original team (just like the current supplemental NFL draft). If the team that signs the player has no available 1st round draft choice in one or more of the following drafts, the original team has the right to accept a lesser package of one 2nd and one 3rd round draft choice – rather than being forced to wait one or more years to finally receive the 1st round draft choice.

Recall the Minnesota Vikings giving up three 1st round draft choices, three 2nd round draft choices, one 3rd round draft choice, one 6th round draft choice, and 5 veteran players . . . just to get their hands on Herschel Walker and a few other picks in return. Recall the Dallas Cowboys giving up two consecutive 1st round draft choices for Joey Galloway, and recall the Atlanta Falcons giving up two consecutive 1st round draft choices (and five picks overall) for Julio Jones in the 2011 NFL Draft. You never know when a team is going to be without their 1st round draft choices or for how many years this may be the situation.

The FAST draft – when the NFL team is in the wrong “having knowingly attempted to damage a player's earning potential through dishonest contract negotiations" – allows the "best to select first," where the selecting team does not forfeit a draft pick from a future draft, and where the original team is barred from participation. The original team is also subject to the loss of a 2nd round pick in the following NFL draft, but this is at the discretion of the NFL Commissioner – with guidance from the 3rd party arbitrator.

Whether the player ends up FAST drafted by one of the better or lesser teams, the team that drafts the player cannot use their franchise tag until after they have successfully signed him (within the current regular season – no matter how much of the season remains). This encourages both parties to get an efficiently-crafted new contract out of the way of what becomes the far more critical issue: learning and becoming comfortable with a new playbook. Play terminology and system schemes are not always similar from team to team . . . and if the player does not catch onto the new system, this fact can really make that great new contract feel like cement shoes at the bottom of the ocean for all involved.

Money is nice and having some is even nicer - especially in the current economy - but most professional sports stars will tell you it is far better to count your millions from the practice field of a winner than a perennial loser. Talk about "making your bed and sleeping in it" if you are a player unfortunate enough to have forced your way into the FAST draft. You could be going somewhere FAST or nowhere FAST.

If the unfathomable happens, and the player goes unselected in the FAST draft, he must sit out the remainder of the season (whether it is part or all of the season). If the player is the cause of his participation into the FAST draft, he will receive no salary during the time he must sit out. If the player’s original team is the cause for his participation, however, the team must pay the player a pro-rated amount of what would have been his one-year tender during the down time (and all of the one-year tender if he must sit for the entire season. The player – either way – will be unrestricted to negotiate with any interested team once the season is complete and the off-season free agency period begins.

If the equally unfathomable occurs, and there are multiple players available for the FAST draft (due to multiple player / team infractions), the original teams are barred from selecting their own players, but they are free to select the other players.

The DSR, The Disser, The Donald Sterling Rule . . . encourages both the team and the franchise-tagged player to engage in the most professional and efficient contract negotiations possible. The success of those "no muss, no fuss" negotiations help ensure both parties get what they desire: a long-term and fruitful commitment to each other (before any part of the communications can begin to deteriorate).

If one or both parties fail to engage professionally and in good faith, the DSR becomes a poison pill to one or both parties. One or both parties will get dissed by "The Disser." A lesson is taught - and hopefully learned to the point where teams and players rarely-if-ever allow themselves to make the same mistake twice. No one likes being dissed . . . especially in public, where these dramas somehow always end up playing out.

 
 
The franchise tag - and to a lesser extent, the transition tag - have simply become an excuse for NFL teams to take their time with long or longer-term commitments with some (but not all) of their top players. The tags are meant to serve a more urgent purpose - rather than as a "deal with it later" security blanket. Tags used to be the last resort - rather than the first resort - for a team to protect itself against the loss of talented personnel.

Tags should always be followed with a sense of urgency towards a greater commitment between players and their teams. The DSR would be a solid deterrent to the torrent of tagging silliness that continues to torture teams and their talent.

It Is Still About The Fans

I have gone to obnoxious lengths to point out how ridiculous it is that the NFL owners and NFLPA ever allowed labor strife to get this far . . . or exist at all. Call the owners and players lazy, misguided, and even stupid, but calling them greedy is disgracing the definition of greedy.

I have gone to equally obnoxious lengths – in past articles – to point out how gutless the NFL fan base has become in the face of a laundry list of professional, public, and private blunders by owners and players alike.

 
 
While the owners continue to be known for their occasional “misstatements” (SEE Bud Adams), did anyone notice how many times NFL players were either arrested or asked to appear in court during the ongoing lockout (when many fans hoped to see true professionals representing the NFLPA)? Common sense dictates the players were probably warned by their own union chief to stay off police blotters at all costs during the entirety of the still ongoing lockout – to ensure the fans had one less reason not to side with the NFLPA against the owners.

The other side of common sense dictates the players could not have stayed off police blotters if you paid each of them $1 million dollars . . . per day. The owners would certainly have tried to sling mud – drawing attention to the players’ almost daily romper room activities – but probably backed off for fear of being called elitist by fans who have come to expect and accept prison yard behavior by quite a few (but not all) NFL players. But I digress . . . because fans – by and large – only care about what occurs between the hash marks.

I love the Dallas Cowboys football organization – as much as any other diehard Cowboys fan.

I romanticize about the historical achievements of America’s Team – as much as any other diehard Cowboys fan.

I live for the day when those historical achievements once again become achievements of today with the current team – as much as any other diehard Cowboys fan.

I am willing to put up with “warped” player behavior as long as it does not affect or prevent their on-the-field performance – as much as any other diehard Cowboys fan. A suspended Cowboy – after all – is a useless Cowboy.

As The Tortured Cowboys Fan – and a known perfectionist – I am, however, unwilling to give the Cowboys, the greater NFL, or the NFLPA a free pass for allowing themselves to get into their current labor mess . . . and any number of other mini dilemmas their potential “Great New Deal” may still not address.

The players have always maintained they just wanted to show up for work (while changing absolutely nothing about a CBA that – for the first time in NFL history – paid out more to players than owners, if memory serves). The owners have always maintained they just want to stop losing money (while showing no physical proof of their losses to the courts or the players).

Both groups made weak appeals to the fans – expecting the fans to be naive enough to fall for the tragic vision of a panhandling owner waving around a diamond-encrusted tin cup . . . and a homeless player holding up a gold-trimmed cardboard sign that reads “Help me feed my family!”

The fans never fell for either argument, but the fans never called the collective bluff of the NFL owners and NFLPA, either. The fans talk tough – with some even threatening to stop attending games – but they always cave in (unlike my father who stopped watching years ago). “Just give us our football!”

NFL ticket prices will continue to increase . . . and the behavior of NFL owners and players – to each other and towards the fans – will continue to be boorish and less than acceptable. Whenever the NFL owners and players have sounded sincere in the dedications to the fans, it has almost always degenerated into lip service.

Fans found out early how the owners were expecting to tap a $4 billion dollar war chest of network television money – and how the courts wracked the owners’ knuckles with a metal ruler when they were found to be irreparably damaging the players’ ability to collectively bargain.

 
 
Fans found out late how the players were expecting to receive approximately $200,000 each – through an insurance plan – if the upcoming season was never realized. The owners – after allegedly learning of this plan last Thursday – suddenly kicked into a higher gear to bring the recent forward motion of CBA negotiations to a mutually beneficial close.

I find it hard to believe the owners only learned about this plan on Thursday . . . rather than sooner through at least one player who was willing to talk in exchange for an undocumented pre-season bonus. But I digress . . . because fans – by and large – only care about what occurs between the hash marks.

It is still about the fans . . . but the fans continue to make it clear they want nothing to do with the responsibility of holding the NFL and its constituents to higher social standards.

“Just between the hash marks, Ma’am” – Sgt. Joe “Football Fan” Friday. So-be-it. Game ON.

Are the NFL owners and NFLPA brave enough to put their freedom to maximum use with a well-planned, forward-thinking, long-term, and flexible collective bargaining agreement . . . or are they going to abuse their freedom by not using it at all?

Will the NFL owners and NFLPA be a successful blueprint – for U.S. politicians – on how to compromise on a grand plan?

Will NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell and NFLPA Executive Director DeMaurice Smith be nominated as Co-Nobel Peace Prize Winners if that happens?

Fans are ready for some football, but will it finally start with any preseason games?

We shall see. We always do.